This paper deals with two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (worker or doctor). In a standard model, while multiple doctors can be matched to a single hospital, a hospital has a maximum quota: the number of doctors assigned to a hospital cannot exceed a certain limit. In our model, a hospital instead has a fixed budget: the total amount of wages allocated by each hospital to doctors is constrained. With budget constraints, stable matchings may fail to exist and checking for the existence is hard. To deal with the nonexistence of stable matchings, we extend the "matching with contracts" model of Hatfield and Milgrom, so that it handles near-feasible matchings that exceed each budget of the hospitals by a certain amount. We then propose two novel mechanisms that efficiently return such a near-feasible matching that is stable with respect to the actual amount of wages allocated by each hospital. In particular, by sacrificing strategy-proofness, our second mechanism achieves the best possible bound.
Introduction
This paper studies a two-sided, one-to-many matching model when there are budget constraints on one side (firm or hospital), i.e., the total amount of wages that it can pay to the other side (worker or doctor) is limited. The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed. See the book by Roth and Sotomayor [25] or Manlove [20] for a comprehensive survey. In this literature, rather than fixed budgets, maximum quotas are typically used, i.e., the total number of doctors that each hospital can hire is limited.
Some real-world examples are subject to matching with budget constraints: a college can offer stipends to students to recruit better students while the budget for admission is limited, a firm can offer wages to workers under the condition that employment costs depend on earnings in the previous accounting period, a public hospital can offer salaries to doctors in the case where the total amount relies on funds from the government, and so on. To establish our model and concepts, we use doctor-hospital matching as a running example.
However, most papers on matching with monetary transfers assume that budgets are unrestricted (e.g., [17] ). When they are restricted, stable matchings may fail to exist [22, 2] . In particular, Abizada [2] considers a subtly different model from ours and shows that (coalitional) stable matchings, where groups of doctors and hospitals have no profitable deviations, may not exist. 1 We construct and analyze our mechanisms on a "matching with contracts" model [13] , which characterizes a class of mechanisms called the generalized Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism. If a mechanism-specifically, the choice function of every hospital-satisfies three properties, i.e., substitutability, irrelevance of rejected contracts, and law of aggregate demand, then it always finds a "stable" allocation and is strategy-proof for doctors. However, in the presence of budget constraints, the hospital's choice function cannot satisfy these properties because stable matchings may not exist.
To deal with the nonexistence of stable matchings, we focus on a near-feasible matching that exceeds the budget of each hospital by a certain amount. This idea can be interpreted as one in which, for each instance of a matching problem, our mechanisms find a "nearby" instance with a stable matching. For a choice function that produces a nearfeasible matching, the existing properties are not sufficient to ensure the optimality of the hospitals' utilities. To resolve contract has the same amount of wage w, we can regard a budget constraint B h for each hospital h as its maximum quota of B h /w .
A mechanism is a function that takes a profile of doctors' preferences as input and returns matching X . We say a mechanism is stable if it always produces a B H -stable matching for certain B H . We also say a mechanism is strategyproof for doctors if no doctor ever has any incentive to misreport her preference, regardless of what the other doctors report.
Next, we briefly describe a class of mechanisms called the generalized DA mechanism [13] and its properties. This mechanism uses choice functions Ch D : 2 X → 2 X and Ch H : 2 X → 2 X . For each doctor d, its choice function
Then, the choice function of all doctors is given as:
where Ch h is a choice function of h. There are alternative ways to define the choice function of each hospital Ch h . As we discuss later, the mechanisms considered in this paper can be expressed by the generalized DA with different formulations of Ch H . Formally, the generalized DA is given as Algorithm 1.
Here, R (i) is a set of rejected contracts at the ith iteration. Doctors cannot choose contracts in R (i) . Initially, R (0) is empty. Thus, each doctor can choose her most preferred contract. The chosen set by doctors is Y (i) . Then, hospitals choose Z (i) , which is a subset of Y (i) . If Y (i) = Z (i) , i.e., no contract is rejected by the hospitals, the mechanism terminates. Otherwise, it updates R (i) and repeats the same procedure.
Hatfield and Milgrom [13] define a notion of stability, which we refer to as HM-stability.
Definition 2. (HM-STABILITY)
A matching X ⊆ X is said to be HM-stable if X satisfies (i) X = Ch D (X ) = Ch H (X ) and (ii) there is no set of matchings X ⊆ X such that X ⊆ Ch D (X ∪ X ) and X = Ch H (X ∪ X ).
HM-stability unifies stability concepts that are designed for each context of (standard) matching problems without constraints. Indeed, it implies B H -stability if we require the choice functions of hospitals to strictly satisfy budget constraints B H . Let us next see the properties for Ch H .
Hatfield and Milgrom [13] proved that if Ch H satisfies SUB and IRC, the generalized DA always produces a matching that is HM-stable, i.e., B H -stable. If Ch H further satisfies LAD, it is strategy-proof for doctors.
Impossibility and intractability
When no hospital is allowed to violate the given constraints, it is known that stable matchings may not exist [22, 21, 2] .
For readers' convenience, let us describe an example that no stable matching exists in our model. and d 3 , respectively. Then, the set of offered contracts X is
The doctors' preferences are given as follows: 4) . Next, each utility of the hospitals is given from the amount of wages. For example, doctor d 2 prefers contract (d 2 , h 1 , 6) to (d 2 , h 2 , 6). Hospital h 1 has the utility of 9, 6, and 4 for (d 1 , h 1 , 9), (d 2 , h 1 , 6), and (d 3 , h 1 , 4), respectively, i.e.,
For each single contract, it prefers (d 1 , h 1 , 9) to (d 2 , h 1 , 6) to (d 3 , h 1 , 4). Finally, hospital h 1 has a fixed budget of B h1 = 10 and h 2 has B h2 = 6.
We claim that there exists no B H -stable matching in this situation. First, assume d 1 is assigned to h 1 with wage 9. Then no more doctor is assigned to this hospital due to the budget constraint. If d 2 is assigned to h 2 ,
Second, assume d 1 is not assigned to h 1 . If d 2 and d 3 are simultaneously assigned to h 1 , d 3 prefers h 2 to h 1 and h 2 prefers d 3 to being unmatched. If they are assigned to different hospitals, respectively, (d 1 , h 1 , 9) blocks this matching, regardless of which doctor is assigned to h 1 . For the remaining cases, since either hospital is being unmatched, some contract or coalition always block the matching.
Note that f h ({(d, h, w)}) = w holds for any (d, h, w) ∈ X in the above example. Thus, stable matching may not exist even when the utility of each hospital over a set of contracts is the total amount of their wages.
This raises the issue of the complexity of deciding the existence of a B H -stable matching. McDermid and Manlove [21] considered a special case of our model and proved NP-hardness. Hamada et al. [12] examined a similar case to ours and proved that the existence problem is Σ P 2 -complete. To deal with the nonexistence of stable matchings, we focus on a near-feasible matching that exceeds each budget by a certain amount. For each instance of a matching problem, our mechanisms find a nearby instance with a stable matching. The following theorem implies that, to obtain a stable matching, at least one hospital h needs to increase its budget by nearly w h . 
We assume that the preferences of the doctors are
The utilities of each hospital are
Every hospital has the fixed budget
We are going to show that there exists no
In this case, d * must be assigned to h m because we assume X is B H -stable. Precisely, doctor d * prefers h m to being unmatched. Hospital h m prefers the contract with d * , whose utility is one, to Y 0 m , whose utility is
In addition, the wage to d * , that is, β, is smaller than the total wages to Y 0 m , that is, (m − 1)/m. Thus, unless d * is assigned to h m with β, she can form a blocking coalition. Since X contains at least (d * , h m , β) and Y 0 m , we derive
from the assumptions of m, α, and β. Thus, w hm (X ) is strictly greater than (1 + α)B hm . This contradicts that X is B H -feasible, which is implied by B H -stability.
Second, let us consider the other case where, for some i ∈ [m − 1], d 0 i is not assigned to h m , i.e., Y 0 m ⊆ X . In this case, such d 0 i must be assigned to h i . To show this, it is sufficient to consider a situation where (d m i , h i , β) and
can form a blocking coalition unless she is assigned to h i . To consider a set of doctors which are not assigned to h m , we introduce a set of indexes
By the assumption, I is not the empty set. In what follows, we concentrate on matchings where doctor 
prefers h m the most and w hm (X ) = 1. Then, since X hm contains
we derive w hm (X ) = (m − 1)/m + β, which is strictly greater than 1 + α from the assumptions of m, α, and β. Thus, w hm (X ) is strictly greater than (1 + α)B hm . This contradicts that X is B H -stable.
Next, let us examine the other case where, for some i ∈ I, doctor d m i is assigned to h i . In this case, Y i must be chosen by
, and Y i , we derive w hi (X ) = 1 + β > 1 + α from the assumptions of m, α, and β. Thus, w hi (X ) is strictly greater than (1 + α)B hi . This contradicts that X is B H -stable.
New property: Compatibility
This section introduces a new property, which we call compatibility, to extend Hatfield and Milgrom's framework for a situation where budget constraints may be violated. Let us first consider the following choice function for a hospital h:
for each X ⊆ X h . 2 In this case, evaluating Ch * h is computationally hard because the problem is equivalent to the wellknown knapsack problem, which is an NP-hard problem (see e.g., [16] ). Hence, the choice function is not practical. Even worse, the generalized DA does not always produce a B H -stable matching because such a matching need not exist. Furthermore, even if there exists a B H -stable matching, the generalized DA with the choice function may produce an unstable matching.
What choice function Ch h can we construct when we allow it to violate budget constraints? Strategy-proofness is still characterized by SUB, IRC, and LAD because changing the budgets of hospitals does not affect doctors' preferences. However, SUB and IRC are not sufficient to admit a stable matching in our sense.
Intuitively, to admit such a stable matching, the set of contracts chosen by the choice function does maximize the hospital's utility. Otherwise, a hospital with non-optimal utility can form a blocking coalition. To prevent this, we need to introduce a new property. Definition 6. (COMPATIBILITY, COM) Consider a hospital h with a utility function f h , a budget B h , and contracts X h . For any X ⊆ X ⊆ X h such that w h (X ) ≤ max{B h , w h (Ch h (X ))}, it holds that
With this property, the output of the choice function Ch h is guaranteed to be the optimal solution for a knapsack problem with a certain capacity that is greater than or equal to the predefined capacity.
We next prove that COM together with SUB and IRC characterizes stable matchings when budget constraints may be violated. Proof. Let the mechanism terminate at the lth iteration, i.e., X = Y (l) = Z (l) . From its definition, it is immediately derived that the union of Y (i) and R (i) is nondecreasing in i(≤ l), i.e., for any i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , l},
For notational simplicity, we refer to Y (i) ∪ R (i) as T (i) .
Next, to obtain Ch H (X ∪ R (l) ) = X for any X , we claim that Ch H (T (i) ) = Z (i) for any i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l}. For the base case i = 1, we have Ch H (T (1) (1) . For the general case i > 1, we suppose Ch H (T (i−1) ) = Z (i−1) . From (1), we rewrite the SUB condition as T (i−1) \ Ch H (T (i−1) ) ⊆ T (i) \ Ch H (T (i) ). By the inductive hypothesis, we transform the left side of the equation
Hence, it holds that R (i−1) ⊆ T (i) \ Ch H (T (i) ) and thus Ch H (T (i) ) includes no contract in R (i−1) . Together with the IRC condition, Ch H (T (i) ) is equal to
The third equality holds because
. Consequently, we obtain the claim and since X =
Suppose, contrary to our claim, that X ⊆ X h is a blocking coalition for a hospital h. By the definition of blocking coalition, (i) X
Note that this theorem does not specify how much budget a hospital may exceed. Here, one can define a choice function such that the hospital affords to hire all of the doctors who have accepted its contracts much beyond the predefined budgets. The theorem simply ensures that if a choice function satisfies COM, in addition to SUB and IRC, the generalized DA admits a B H -stable matching X with B h = max{B h , w h (X )} for each hospital.
We also remark that if each hospital h knows the selectable contracts, i.e., Y
h , in advance, it only needs to select arg max{f h (X ) | X ⊆ X h ∪ R (l) h , w h (X ) ≤ B h } for a certain budget B h (≥ B h ). However, the selectable contracts are difficult to predict because the resulting set depends on the choice function itself. It is not so straightforward to design or find a choice function such that it satisfies the required properties and only violates budget constraints to an acceptable extent.
Near-feasible stable mechanisms
In matching with constraints [15, 11, 19] , designing a desirable mechanism essentially tailors choice functions for hospitals to satisfy necessary properties and constraints simultaneously. We tackle this challenging task as an analogue to approximation or online algorithms for knapsack problems.
Let us start from Dantzig's greedy algorithm for fractional knapsack problems [7] . It greedily selects contracts with respect to utility per wage and then outputs an optimal but fractional solution. We need to develop an algorithm that always provides an integral solution. Roughly speaking, we have to provide an algorithm (choice function) that satisfies the necessary properties, e.g., SUB and COM, for any set of contracts X given at each round of the generalized DA. At the same time, we need to let the algorithm determine how much budget should be exceeded beyond the predefined one (how many contracts should be chosen). Indeed, at each round, it is difficult to predict the amount of excess over the budgets without violating the necessary properties. In what follows, we propose two choice functions that adaptively specify how much budgets should be spent within the generalized DA process.
Strategy-proof stable mechanism
This subsection proposes a strategy-proof mechanism that outputs a matching X that is B H -stable where B h is at most w h · B h /w h for any h ∈ H. Let k h = B h /w h . The choice function greedily takes the top min{k h , |X |} contracts according to utility per wage. Formally, it is given as Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2:
input: X ⊆ X h output: Ch h (X ) 1 Initialize Y ← ∅; 2 Sort X in descending order of utility per wage; 3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , min{k h , |X |} do 4 add the ith contract in X to Y ;
We remark that we can implement the mechanism to run in O(|X| log |X|) time by using heaps. Let us prepare a min-heap with respect to utility per wage for each hospital. We derive the time complexity from an "amortized" analysis and can add a newly proposed contract x ∈ X h to the heap for h in O(log(|X h |)) time. When a hospital h rejects a contract, we can delete it in O(log(|X h |)) time. Hence, we obtain that the total time complexity is O( h∈H |X h | log(|X h |)) = O(|X| log(|X|)).
Next, let us illustrate this mechanism via an example. Here, h 1 offers the doctors wages from 42 to 57, while h 2 offers each of them wage 100. We assume that the preferences of the doctors are The utilities of the hospitals are given in Table 1 . Each hospital has a common fixed budget 100 (B h1 = B h2 = 100). First, each doctor chooses her most preferred contract;
Since B h1 /w h1 = 3, Ch h1 (X ) chooses the top three contracts according to the ranking of utilities per wage shown in Table 1 {(d 1 , h 2 , 100)}, whose utility per wage is larger than (d 5 , h 2 , 100). Next, d 5 chooses her second preferred contract, i.e., (d 5 , h 1 , 50), whose utility per wage is 2.02. Since this is higher than the other contract in X h1 , (d 2 , h 1 , 50) is rejected. Thus, d 2 chooses her second preferred contract, i.e., (d 2 , h 2 , 100);
Ch h2 (X ) = {(d 1 , h 2 , 100)}, since it has a higher utility per wage than (d 2 , h 2 , 100). Finally, since d 2 no longer has a preferred contract: Theorem 3. The generalized DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 2 is strategy-proof for doctors and it produces a B H -stable matching such that B h ≤ B h ≤ w h · k h for any h ∈ H. In addition, the mechanism can be implemented to run in O(|X| log |X|) time.
Finally, note that, this mechanism is almost tight as long as we use the choice functions that satisfy LAD and COM. 
. , x 2k }, and
Here, s + t ≥ k holds. Without loss of generality, we may assume that Ch(X h ) = {x 1 , . . . , x s , x k+1 , . . . , x k+t }.
On the other hand, if s < w h /w h , we get that
Non-strategy-proof stable mechanism
This subsection proposes a stable mechanism that is not strategy-proof, but improves the budget bound, i.e., this mechanism outputs a matching X that is B H -stable where B h is at most B h + w h for any h ∈ H. This bound is best possible from Theorem 1.
As with the first one, the second choice function greedily picks the top min{k h , |X |} contracts. However, k h is
denotes the ith highest contract with respect to utility per wage. Formally, it is given as Algorithm 3. Note that the running time is O(|X| log |X|), as with the first mechanism. Let us Algorithm 3:
input: X ⊆ X h output: Ch h (X ) 1 Initialize Y ← ∅; 2 Sort X in descending order of utility per wage; 3 for i = 1, 2, . . . , |X | do Example 3. We consider a situation that is identical to Example 2 and the first two rounds are the same.
At the third round, when d 5 chooses (d 5 , h 1 , 50);
The number of contracts Ch h1 (X ) chooses changes from three to two; the total wage of the first two contracts for h 1 , i.e., 105, exceeds the budget limit of 100. Thus, (d 2 , h 1 , 50) and (d 3 , h 1 , 42) are rejected. Next, d 2 and d 3 choose their second preferred contracts, i.e., (d 2 , h 2 , 100) and (d 3 , h 2 , 100), but those contracts are also rejected. Finally, since they have no longer preferred contracts,
No contract is rejected and the mechanism terminates.
Here, we show the properties that this mechanism satisfies. Lemma 3. For each hospital, the choice function defined in Algorithm 3 is SUB, IRC, and COM.
Proof. IRC clearly follows from the definition of the choice functions. Next, we claim that the choice functions satisfy SUB. Let X ⊆ X ⊆ X h . By definition, the utility per wage of any contract in Ch h (X ) (⊇ Ch h (X ) ∩ X ) is higher than that of any contract in X \ Ch h (X ) (⊇ X \ Ch h (X )). Hence, we can partition X into two subsets: H = Ch h (X ) ∩ X and L = X \ Ch h (X ). Any contract in H has higher utility per wage than any contract in L.
When Ch h takes X as an input, it first picks all of the contracts in H and some contracts in L. Therefore, we obtain Ch h (X ) ∩ X ⊆ Ch h (X ) and derive the SUB property:
Finally, we prove COM. Let X = {x (1) , . . . , x (|X |) } ⊆ X h , where the contracts are arranged in decreasing order of the utility per wage. If w h (X ) ≤ B h , then it is clear that Ch h (X ) = X and f h (Ch h (X )) ≥ f h (X ) hold for any X ⊆ X . Otherwise, let Ch h (X ) = {x (1) , . . . , x (k) }. Here, (1) , . . . , x (k) }) holds. As described in Lemma 1, since the greedy solution Ch h (X ) is optimal, we have f h (Ch h (X )) ≥ f h (X ) for any X ⊆ X such that w h (X ) ≤ w h (Ch h (X )). Thus, the lemma holds.
It is straightforward to demonstrate that Algorithm 3 does not satisfy LAD. In Example 2, when a set of contracts {(d 2 , h 1 , 50), (d 3 , h 1 , 42), (d 4 , h 1 , 55)} is given, the choice function chooses all the three contracts. Here, if (d 1 , h 1 , 57) is further added, it chooses only two contracts, i.e., {(d 1 , h 1 , 57), (d 2 , h 1 , 50)}. Thus, the second mechanism fails to satisfy LAD. 
Now, we summarize the results for our second mechanism.
Theorem 5. The generalized DA mechanism with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 3 produces a set of contracts X that is B H -stable where B h ≤ B h < B h + w h for any h ∈ H. In addition, the mechanism can be implemented to run in O(|X| log |X|) time.
Two special cases
This section examines two special cases of hospitals' utilities.
Proportional case
This subsection examines a special case of hospitals' utilities where each hospital has utility over a set of contracts that is proportional to the total amount of wages. Formally, for every h ∈ H, X ∈ X h , and a constant γ h (> 0),
holds. In this case, we can make the second mechanism strategy-proof without sacrificing the budget bound although stable matching may not exist as Example 1. Specifically, we modify Algorithm 3 so that i) sort X in increasing order of wage, instead of decreasing order of utility per wage; ii) pick the contracts in the order while keeping the total wage less than B h ; iii) add the contract with the highest wage unless it is already chosen. Formally, we define as follows.
Algorithm 4:
input: X ⊆ X h output: Ch h (X ) 1 Initialize Y ← ∅; 2 Sort X according to increasing order of wages;
add the |X |th contract (highest wage contract) to Y ; 7 return Y ;
Lemma 5. For each hospital h, the choice function defined in Algorithm 4 is SUB, IRC, and COM.
and let k (< |X |) be the largest integer that satisfy
Also, let X = {x (σ(1)) , . . . , x (σ(s)) } ⊆ X such that σ(1) < · · · < σ(s) and let k (< |X |) be the largest index that satisfy
Then, we have k ≤ σ(k ) by x
. Ch h is IRC because Ch h (X ) = Ch(X ) holds for any Ch h (X ) ⊆ X ⊆ X by the definition of the choice function.
Ch h is SUB because
⊆ {x (σ(1)) , . . . , x (σ(k )) , x (σ(s)) } = Ch h (X ).
Thus, Ch h is SUB and IRC.
Next we claim that Ch h is COM. Let t satisfy that
We consider the three following cases.
Thus, it holds that
If h = |X |, we have Ch h (X ) = X , and hence
If w h (Ch h (X )) < B h and h < |X |, we obtain 
Equal profit case
We next consider the case that each hospital has the same utility across contracts. Formally, for every h, X ⊆ X h , and a constant γ h (> 0), f h (X ) = γ h · |X | holds. In this case, we obtain a strategy-proof mechanism that always produces a conventional stable matching, which never violates the given budget constraints. The choice function greedily chooses contracts in an increasing order of wage until just before the total wage of chosen contracts exceeds the constraint.
Theorem 7. The generalized DA with the choice functions defined in Algorithm 5 is strategy-proof and it produces a stable matching.
Discussion
Our model assumes that the amount of predefined budgets is flexible up to a certain amount. There is certainly some realistic situation where this assumption is justified. Indeed, in firm-worker matchings, if a firm finds an application from some worker who is appropriate for the business, the CEO would agree to increasing the employment cost. In doctor-hospital matchings, hospitals can make an association that pools some funds in advance and subsidizes the expense of salaries according to matching results. Alternatively, even when budgets must not be exceeded, we can let our mechanisms work by setting the budget B h to B h − w h in advance. Our second mechanism produces a B H -stable matching such that B h − w h ≤ B h ≤ B h for any h ∈ H. Our model can also handle a matching problem with inseparable couples, which was studied by McDermid and Manlove [21] . In this problem, there are single doctors and couples. Each single doctor and couple has a preference over hospitals and each hospital has a maximum quota. Then, we can regard the problem as ours with each wage 1 or 2 and budgets correspond to maximum quotas. Thus, our second mechanism outputs a stable matching that exceeds each maximum quota up to 1.
Let us discuss about the validity of increasing budgets. In the case that firms offer wages to workers, the firm may be able to increase its budget if it can employ superior workers. In the case that public hospitals offer salaries to doctors, some association may subsidize the expense of the salaries. When budgets are hard constraints, B Hstable matchings may not exist but we can get a stable matching by decreasing budgets. In fact, by using our second mechanism with reducing the budgets of hospitals to B h − w h in advance, we can obtain a B H -stable matching such that B h − w h ≤ B h ≤ B h holds for any h ∈ H.
One might think that we could handle budget constraints together with maximum quota constraints. However, it is not so straightforward to design an appropriate choice function that handles both constraints simultaneously. Suppose, for example, that a hospital has the maximum quota of one and offers two contracts. One contract x has lower wage than the other contract x (x W < x W ). The hospital has lower utility for the former than the latter (f h (x) < f h (x )), and conversely it has higher utility per wage for the former than the latter (f h (x)/x W > f h (x )/x W ). {x } is the unique stable matching. Simply if the choice function additionally checks whether the current number of chosen contracts exceeds the maximum quota in line 5 in Algorithm 3, it chooses {x} and it fails to provide the stable matching. In general, this problem is known as cardinality constrained knapsack problem [6, 16] . Building upon techniques for the problem, whether we can construct a proper choice function or not is still an open question.
Conclusion
This paper deals with matching with budget constraints, introduced a concept of near-feasible matchings and proposed two novel mechanisms that return a stable matching in polynomial time: one is strategy-proof and the other is not. Furthermore, we derived the bound of increment of the budgets. In particular, the best possible bound is obtained by sacrificing strategy-proofness. In future work, we would like to derive the lower bound for strategy-proof mechanisms and extend our results to matching problems with other constraints.
